View from the Middle East, Jan 31. New Course for the Palestinian Dialogue

Blogger's Note: This is an article about recent Palestinian history, the split between Fatah and Hamas and the possible course of action for the future. The article is a bit dense and confusing toward the end but gives a good background on the root of the cause.

The relationship between the two splits, the Palestinian one and the Arab one, is a phenomenon for anyone who has been following the developments in the region for the past two years. For this reason, a connection has to be made between the effort to correct the trajectory of the Arab-Arab relations and any new attempt to end the Palestinian schism which would make realizing national unity possible. But achieving progress to treat this fracture stops at a positive evaluation of the previous effort that took place in two main stages, one of which started at the end of 2003 and the second, which began during 2006. The split in the first stage was political with an ideological background. But the worry of the Egyptians about the worsening of the split, despite its limitedness of scope at the time, forced it to move to consider a national dialogue within the frame of its endeavour to attempt to strengthen the Arab position overall after the American occupation of Iraq.

The Egyptian initiative hoped to achieve an agreement on a national Palestinian program, and was an internal dialogue which had started in the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip more than a year before the initiative got off of the ground. The essential problem which the Egyptian initiative faced was the difficulty, or perhaps the impossibility, of an agreement on a long term strategic program between factions who differed in their end goals. And that was the mistake, the management of the dialogue in this phase was done methodically; that is, in regards to the course of the dialogue and the foundation on which it stood.

This phase could not possibly continue after the passing of Arafat, despite the "sentimental" atmosphere which accompanied his passing and which helped in the reaching of the "Cairo Announcement" on March 17, 2005. But Arafat's death ended a phase entirely. And a new Palestinian era began, in which the schism was on the way to becoming inevitable when "Hamas" won in the legitimate elections in January 2006. After the split became political based on ideology, it took on organizational dimensions balanced on thin governmental supports. For this reason, it was natural that the dialogue transformed from focusing on the search for an impossible agreement on end goals for national Palestinian action to a deep plunge toward the smaller goals of the factions of the action, and in particular, the two biggest factions, the "Fatah" and "Hamas" movements. The matter of the dividing of authority between the two became a point of contention and from there the main subject of the dialogue. For this was not just a procedural matter, but it was tied in with the political and ideological split and thus the resolution remained difficult. In the absence of even the smallest amount of trust, it was natural that the first accord that was concluded between the two in the second phase of the dialogue failed, and which had as a title "The Charter of National Unity", signed on June 27, 2006, a year before the split reached an unprecedented climax. The agreement collapsed faster than was expected and the situation began to crumble to the earth quickly, surpassing all expectations, where it reached the point of the outbreak of armed clashes which ended an era in which the slogan "Palestinian blood is a red line" was very much revered.

When Egypt proposed all it could muster at that time, a sort of lack of confidence creeped into its relations with Hamas and the Saudi leadership had to intervene to save what it could save and find a solution by offering to hold the dialogue in Mecca. But the oath the leaders of the warring parties had sworn at this holy site could not prevent the collapse of the agreement that they signed under Saudi guidance on Februrary 8, 2007, a document titled "Mecca Agreement."

At that point the collapse began to pick up speed until the huge shock which led to Hamas assuming power in the Gaza Strip on June 14, 2007. The crisis worsened until it reached an unprecedented nadir. The schism had produced a geographical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, not to mention the other political, ideological, "organizational" and factional dimensions.

The matter required almost a whole year before Egypt resumed its efforts to resolve this rift. Many efforts came from other sources during that year, from Yemen, Senegal and others, but they all arrived at a blocked-off road.

Egypt had grown up during that year, imagining a new national Palestinian dialogue based on a connection between resolving the fracture and the future of the issue itself. The Egyptian initiative began in August of last year, via an invitation from the Palestinian factions to Cairo to hold bilateral talks. The aim of the bilateral talks was to put forth a draft for what Egpyt considered a national Palestinian project and which was fundamental for a direct dialogue between the factions.

The draft of the treaty was full of various issues which were in agreement with the course Egypt supported, and which tried to include all the goals of the dialogue that existed in the first and second stages. The draft dealt with the fissure which created a geographical split by reorganizing the Palestinian issue completely. And it proposed, to that end, the formation of a unified government which would have defined functions, namely the lifting of the blockade, easing the daily life of the Palestinian people, preparing for the holding of new legitimate presidential elections, and the supervision of the rebuilding the security apparati on a national and professional and not sectarian basis.

To reinforce this action, the draft advised for the obtainment of Arab help, but without defining the exact meaning of that help, because Hamas had objected to requesting help from Arab forces.

The draft did not stop at this point as the operational resolution, which was the majority of the contents of the agreements on June 2006 and February 2007, but it tied in with it the development of the Palestininan Liberation Organization, with the reconfirmation that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, based on the fact that Hamas had accepted this previously, in the Cairo Declaration which was issued in March of 2005.

The draft defined the meaning of this development, that the organization would have the power and control over all the factions, without suggesting that the both movements "Hamas" and "Al-Jihad" join it, considering that an implicit notion. But it declared that the PLO would remain the broad, national leading body and the high political authority for the Palestinians. And it added what was previously mentioned in the 2005 declaration, an election for a new national congress for the PLO on the inside, outside, and wherever it was possible.

And the draft tied this widely scoped framework, for what possibly could become the Palestinian nation reconciliation, to a plan for the management of the struggle with Israel that was borrowed from the success of the detente which Egypt achieved in the Gaza Strip and which entered the implementation stage 2 months before the initiative to resume the Palestinan dialogue. Despite the fact that the draft included in it that the resistance had the right to enact laws for the Palestinian people as long as the occupation existed, it tied in with it the existence of national unity, whereas it supported that negotiations with Israel be managed by the PLO and the President of the Palestinian Authority with Israel and it merged the final authority on any agreement which was possible to be reached with the National Council of the PLO, and not the legislative assembly in which Hamas enjoys a majority.

And this was one of 9 points to which Hamas objected, in addition to the title of the draft, which it requested to be changed from "The National Palestinian Treaty" to "The Treaty of the Palestinian Reconciliation". And despite not objecting publicly to the Egyptian stance when it demanded that it bring up all that it wanted at the Palestinian dialogue table with the other factions, it was clear that the size and type of its reservations to the draft, are not what is causing it to participate in this dialogue. This was the real reason it requested two days ago to postpone it from its agreed upon date, i.e. last November 9, despite justifying its position by the insistence of the authority in Ramallah not to release the Hamas prisoners in the West Bank.

The main lesson that can be learned, from the efforts expended to put the Palestinians on the same page and arriving to the recent attempt, from last August to November, is that everytime ambition became stronger, the ability to realize it weakened and the chance to achieve something from it regressed. Perhaps it would be better planning to lay out less ambitious goals this time, in attempt to arrive at partial cooperation, at first, between Hamas and Fatah and their apparati in the West Bank and Gaza, which would allow them to gradually regain the lost trust, on the path to achieving more ambitious goals on a more solid foundation.

This is the new course of action which Egypt could employ in its efforts to solve the Palestinian fracture in the coming days.

http://www.alittihad.co.ae/wajhatdetails.php?id=42852

View from the Middle East, Jan. 30, Obama's attack on the Muslims

I was writing an article during the presidential electoral campaign last spring, in which I feared that the candidate's, Barack Obama, association, at that time, with Islam would transform into an issue between him and an objective viewpoint which would also turn into an issue in which Arabs and Muslims would become involved. The reason at the time was that he avoided talking or commenting about the roots and history of his Muslim family.

I did not rely on his sympathy with the Muslims because his sole job is the service to the interests of his country, but indubitably I was afraid that the racial attacks on his biracial background would cause a problem that would cause him to treat the Arabs and Muslims unjustly. The Secretary of State George Schultz, in the Reagan era, was on record for having been considered a suspicious appointment just because he used to work with a company with subsidiaries in the Middle East and he was unjust and cruel in his dealings as a Minister with Arab parties, as opposed to Henry Kissinger, who held the same post during the Nixon era. And despite the Arabs' fear of the Jew Kissinger, he was able to conclude a deal with Syria for the disengagement of troops and the foundation of new relations with Egypt.

But the truth is, that I was surprised by Obama's meeting on TV where he willingly talked about the Muslim members of his family, and that he lived in muslim Indonesia. An "accusation" transformed into a "distinguishing feature" where he connected with Muslims, and that, he, as an American Christian and President of the United States of America does not hold any grudge and anger against the Muslims, and that he calls to open to a new page with them. This has surpassed merely taking a stance different than what his predecessor George Bush took. He, Bush, was famous for his sentence: "Either for us or against us." Obama has stratified the world into three categories, either in his group, or against him, like Al-Qa'ida, or just those that disagree with him. Obama insists on saying that he makes the distinction among those that differ with his country in the region, that they are not necessarily enemies. And he has gone even further than that, extending his hand to the Iranians, a hand that has not been extended since the time of Jimmy Carter, that is, since 30 years ago.

Obama was warm in his conversation to the billion Muslims of the world. But despite his friendly language and tone and the positive welcoming of his talk, the connection with the Muslims is a very complex issue. The overwhelming majority of Muslims do not have any connection with terrorism of "Al-Qa'ida" ; on the contrary, Muslim have suffered because of Al-Qa'ida more than Americans, and for many years before the occurrences on September 11, when hundreds of people died during their crimes in Egypt, Algeria and Saudia Arabia. The American problem is a blend of an historical and cultural accumulation and, above all, political and state-controlled propaganda which has made reconciliation a difficult task. The majority of Muslims are peace-loving, quiet and and hard working, searching for their daily bread. But the one who hears his voice the loudest, are the groups Obama won't be able to reconcile with, the ones who really have to be reckoned with, such as The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, which has one plan: to rule Egypt. And it will stand unlike the official regime, as opposition in any matter or general affair. This negative stance is not particular just to the opposition but to all radical regimes, such as the Iranian regime which is considering changing the region according to it's plan, even if that means spreading chaos. But the Muslims, like any other people in the world, do not agree on all matters and particular ruling bodies, and therefore dealing with a billion Muslims is much more complicated than dealing with a billion Chinese who have one leader and one plan.

http://www.asharqalawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=11022&article=505174